Akira Review this actor's tracked leak-site claims, published reporting, and attributed threat evidence.
ransomware 1,877 leak-site claims, all timeLatest observed leak-site post 2026-11-05
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Executive facts
Actor Akira
Kind ransomware
Actor record created 2026-07-07
Latest observed 2026-11-05
Leak-site claims 1,877
ATT&CK group G1024
Catalogued techniques 17
How linked to MITRE: MITRE's name or alias matches this group Scope
Tracked sectors Manufacturing, Construction & Engineering, Business & Professional Services, Legal, Retail
Claim records 2023-04-29 to 2026-11-05
News stories naming this group 2024-09-20 to 2026-11-05 Vulnerability events linked to this group No dated vulnerability events are attached to this group's linked vulnerabilities.
Verified techniques Derived only from this actor's stored verified ATT&CK group-to-technique mappings (ATT&CK 20.0); phases are not scored. MITRE group provenance .
Defensive actions M1047 Audit 6 techniques M1018 User Account Management 5 techniques M1042 Disable or Remove Feature or Program 5 techniques M1026 Privileged Account Management 4 techniques M1038 Execution Prevention 4 techniques M1017 User Training 3 techniques M1030 Network Segmentation 3 techniques M1032 Multi-factor Authentication 3 techniques M1015 Active Directory Configuration 2 techniques M1021 Restrict Web-Based Content 2 techniques Ransomware claim data is unverified: RansomLook (CC BY 4.0) and ransomware.live (Terms of use: credit and link required).
MITRE ATT&CK names and links © The MITRE Corporation.
Most-claimed sectors Manufacturing Construction & Engineering Business & Professional Services Legal Retail
Activity window in this site's data
This is only the dates observed by this site. It is not this actor's lifetime or evidence of dormancy outside these dates.
Claim records First observed 2023-04-29 Latest observed 2026-11-05
News stories naming this group First observed 2024-09-20 Latest observed 2026-11-05 Claims posted under this group's name or leak-site brand 1877 News stories naming this group 23 Origin and motivation
Origin and motivation not attributed.
Claims posted under this group's name or leak-site brand
1877 on this site System Plus Technology 2026-11-05 source ↗ David L Wade & Associates Business & Professional Services 2026-11-05 source ↗ Source Energy Services Energy & Utilities 2026-11-05 source ↗ Westboro Partners Financial Services 2026-11-05 source ↗ Erowa Manufacturing 2026-11-04 source ↗ Krishnan Business & Professional Services 2026-11-04 source ↗ SK Global Software Technology 2026-11-03 source ↗ Pelham Plastics Manufacturing 2026-11-03 source ↗ Bison Bag Manufacturing 2026-11-03 source ↗ Howells Motor Freight Transportation & Logistics 2026-11-02 source ↗ View all on Breaches → Leak-site claim activity
Claims per month, 2023-04 to 2026-11. Peak 155 in 2026-05.
9 39 26 17 30 9 13 19 17 26 16 17 17 21 20 31 6 21 11 74 53 40 52 44 69 29 45 42 40 52 71 87 69 116 94 150 26 155 62 27 31 36 36 12
2023-04 2026-11
Show monthly counts as a table 0 additional claims without a disclosure date
Defensive actions
The MITRE ATT&CK mitigations countering the most of this group's known techniques, derived automatically from MITRE's own group and mitigation data. Each links to the full guidance with NIST 800-53 controls and authoritative configuration sources.
M1047 Audit 6 techniques M1018 User Account Management 5 techniques M1042 Disable or Remove Feature or Program 5 techniques M1026 Privileged Account Management 4 techniques M1038 Execution Prevention 4 techniques M1017 User Training 3 techniques M1030 Network Segmentation 3 techniques M1032 Multi-factor Authentication 3 techniques M1015 Active Directory Configuration 2 techniques M1021 Restrict Web-Based Content 2 techniques All defensive actions for Akira → Detection rules
SigmaHQ detection rules mapped to this group's MITRE ATT&CK techniques. One technique maps to many rules, so this shows the top few by status and severity, with a link to the full set on SigmaHQ.
Detection rules for Akira Showing 8 of 181
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
Detection prerequisites: Log source: antivirus
False positives: Unlikely
Show rule YAML title: Antivirus - Exploitation Framework Signature
id: 238527ad-3c2c-4e4f-a1f6-92fd63adb864
status: stable
description: |
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports an exploitation framework.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
- https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/925b0b28472d4d79b4bf92050e38cc2b8f722691c713fc28743ac38551bc3797
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/8f8daabe1c8ceb5710949283818e16c4aa8059bf2ce345e2f2c90b8692978424
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d9669f7e3eb3a9cdf6a750eeb2ba303b5ae148a43e36546896f1d1801e912466
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2018-09-09
modified: 2026-06-15
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1203
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1219.002
logsource:
category: antivirus
detection:
selection:
Signature|contains:
- 'ATK/Cobalt'
- 'Backdoor.Cobalt'
- 'Beacon'
- 'Brutel'
- 'BruteR'
- 'CbltStr'
- 'CobaltStr'
- 'COBALT.SMD'
- 'COBEACON'
- 'Cometer'
- 'Exploit.Script.CVE'
- 'IISExchgSpawnCMD'
- 'Metasploit'
- 'Meterpreter'
- 'MeteTool'
- 'Mpreter'
- 'MsfShell'
- 'PowerSploit'
- 'Razy'
- 'Rozena'
- 'Sbelt'
- 'Seatbelt'
- 'Sliver'
- 'Swrort'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗ Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
Detection prerequisites: Log source: antivirus
False positives: Unlikely
Show rule YAML title: Antivirus - Password Dumper Signature
id: 78cc2dd2-7d20-4d32-93ff-057084c38b93
status: stable
description: |
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports password dumpers and stealers.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place and check if passwords need to be reset.
references:
- https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5fcda49ee7f202559a6cbbb34edb65c33c9a1e0bde9fa2af06a6f11b55ded619
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a4edfbd42595d5bddb442c82a02cf0aaa10893c1bf79ea08b9ce576f82749448
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2018-09-09
modified: 2026-06-15
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1558
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.t1003.002
logsource:
category: antivirus
detection:
selection:
- Signature|startswith: 'PWS'
- Signature|contains:
- 'Certify'
- 'DCSync'
- 'Creddump'
- 'DumpCreds'
- 'DumpLsass'
- 'DumpPert'
- 'FormBook'
- 'HTool/WCE'
- 'Kekeo'
- 'Lazagne'
- 'LsassDump'
- 'Lummast'
- 'Mimikatz'
- 'MultiDump'
- 'Multiverze'
- 'Nanodump'
- 'NativeDump'
- 'Outflank'
- 'PShlSpy'
- 'PSWTool'
- 'PWCrack'
- 'PWDump'
- 'PWS.'
- 'PWSX'
- 'pypykatz'
- 'Rubeus'
- 'SafetyKatz'
- 'SecurityTool'
- 'SharpChrome'
- 'SharpDPAPI'
- 'SharpDump'
- 'SharpKatz'
- 'SharpS.' # Sharpsploit, e.g. 530ea2ff9049f5dfdfa0a2e9c27c2e3c0685eb6cbdf85370c20a7bfae49f592d
- 'ShpKatz'
- 'Steal'
- 'TrickDump'
- 'wsass'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗ Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
Detection prerequisites: Platform: windows · Log source: process_creation
False positives: Unknown
Show rule YAML title: Exploit for CVE-2015-1641
id: 7993792c-5ce2-4475-a3db-a3a5539827ef
status: stable
description: Detects Winword starting uncommon sub process MicroScMgmt.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2015-1641
references:
- https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/5567408950b744c4e846ba8ae726883cb15268a539f3bb21758a466e47021ae8/analysis/
- https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/5567408950b744c4e846ba8ae726883cb15268a539f3bb21758a466e47021ae8?environmentId=100
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-02-22
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1036.005
- cve.2015-1641
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ParentImage|endswith: '\WINWORD.EXE'
Image|endswith: '\MicroScMgmt.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗ Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
Detection prerequisites: Platform: windows · Log source: process_creation
False positives: Unlikely
Show rule YAML title: HackTool - Rubeus Execution
id: 7ec2c172-dceb-4c10-92c9-87c1881b7e18
related:
- id: 7ec2c172-dceb-4c10-92c9-87c1881b7e18
type: similar
status: stable
description: Detects the execution of the hacktool Rubeus via PE information of command line parameters
references:
- https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/from-kekeo-to-rubeus
- https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html
- https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-12-19
modified: 2023-04-20
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1558.003
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1550.003
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- Image|endswith: '\Rubeus.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'Rubeus.exe'
- Description: 'Rubeus'
- CommandLine|contains:
- 'asreproast '
- 'dump /service:krbtgt '
- 'dump /luid:0x'
- 'kerberoast '
- 'createnetonly /program:'
- 'ptt /ticket:'
- '/impersonateuser:'
- 'renew /ticket:'
- 'asktgt /user:'
- 'harvest /interval:'
- 's4u /user:'
- 's4u /ticket:'
- 'hash /password:'
- 'golden /aes256:'
- 'silver /user:'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗ Author: Vasiliy Burov, oscd.community
Detection prerequisites: Platform: windows · Log source: process_creation
False positives: Unlikely
Show rule YAML title: LockerGoga Ransomware Activity
id: 74db3488-fd28-480a-95aa-b7af626de068
status: stable
description: Detects LockerGoga ransomware activity via specific command line.
references:
- https://medium.com/@malwaredancer/lockergoga-input-arguments-ipc-communication-and-others-bd4e5a7ba80a
- https://blog.f-secure.com/analysis-of-lockergoga-ransomware/
- https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/
author: Vasiliy Burov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-18
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.t1486
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains: '-i SM-tgytutrc -s'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗ Author: Sittikorn S
Detection prerequisites: Platform: aws · Service: cloudtrail
False positives: System or Network administrator behaviors; DEV, UAT, SAT environment. You should apply this rule with PROD environment only.
Show rule YAML title: AWS SecurityHub Findings Evasion
id: a607e1fe-74bf-4440-a3ec-b059b9103157
status: stable
description: Detects the modification of the findings on SecurityHub.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/securityhub/
author: Sittikorn S
date: 2021-06-28
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: securityhub.amazonaws.com
eventName:
- 'BatchUpdateFindings'
- 'DeleteInsight'
- 'UpdateFindings'
- 'UpdateInsight'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- System or Network administrator behaviors
- DEV, UAT, SAT environment. You should apply this rule with PROD environment only.
level: high
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗ Author: Thomas Patzke
Detection prerequisites: Platform: windows · Log source: process_creation
False positives: Unknown
Show rule YAML title: HackTool - CrackMapExec Execution Patterns
id: 058f4380-962d-40a5-afce-50207d36d7e2
status: stable
description: Detects various execution patterns of the CrackMapExec pentesting framework
references:
- https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2023-11-06
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.execution
- attack.t1047
- attack.t1053
- attack.t1059.003
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.s0106
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
# cme/protocols/smb/wmiexec.py (generalized execute_remote and execute_fileless)
- 'cmd.exe /Q /c * 1> \\\\*\\*\\* 2>&1'
# cme/protocols/smb/atexec.py:109 (fileless output via share)
- 'cmd.exe /C * > \\\\*\\*\\* 2>&1'
# cme/protocols/smb/atexec.py:111 (fileless output via share)
- 'cmd.exe /C * > *\\Temp\\* 2>&1'
# https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/d8c50c8cbaf36c29329078662473f75e440978d2/cme/helpers/powershell.py#L136 (PowerShell execution with obfuscation)
- 'powershell.exe -exec bypass -noni -nop -w 1 -C "'
# https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/d8c50c8cbaf36c29329078662473f75e440978d2/cme/helpers/powershell.py#L160 (PowerShell execution without obfuscation)
- 'powershell.exe -noni -nop -w 1 -enc '
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗ Author: Bhabesh Raj, Nasreddine Bencherchali
Detection prerequisites: Platform: windows · Service: windefend
False positives: Administrator might try to disable defender features during testing (must be investigated)
Show rule YAML title: Microsoft Defender Tamper Protection Trigger
id: 49e5bc24-8b86-49f1-b743-535f332c2856
status: stable
description: Detects blocked attempts to change any of Defender's settings such as "Real Time Monitoring" and "Behavior Monitoring"
references:
- https://bhabeshraj.com/post/tampering-with-microsoft-defenders-tamper-protection
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/troubleshoot-microsoft-defender-antivirus?view=o365-worldwide
author: Bhabesh Raj, Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2021-07-05
modified: 2022-12-06
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: windows
service: windefend
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5013 # Tamper protection blocked a change to Microsoft Defender Antivirus. If Tamper protection is enabled then, any attempt to change any of Defender's settings is blocked. Event ID 5013 is generated and states which setting change was blocked.
Value|endswith:
- '\Windows Defender\DisableAntiSpyware'
- '\Windows Defender\DisableAntiVirus'
- '\Windows Defender\Scan\DisableArchiveScanning'
- '\Windows Defender\Scan\DisableScanningNetworkFiles'
- '\Real-Time Protection\DisableRealtimeMonitoring'
- '\Real-Time Protection\DisableBehaviorMonitoring'
- '\Real-Time Protection\DisableIOAVProtection'
- '\Real-Time Protection\DisableScriptScanning'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrator might try to disable defender features during testing (must be investigated)
level: high
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗ View all detecting rules on SigmaHQ → Detection rules licensed under Detection Rule License (DRL) 1.1 , from SigmaHQ. Each rule retains its author.
Validation tests
Atomic Red Team validating tests mapped to this group's MITRE ATT&CK techniques, shown beside the detection rules so you can validate the detections. This shows the top few, with a link to the full set on GitHub. Descriptive metadata only, never the attack commands.
Validating tests for Akira Showing 8 of 141
Platforms: windows
Red teamer's avoid IEX and Invoke-WebRequest in your PowerShell commands. Instead, host a text record with a payload to compromise hosts.
[reference](https://twitter.com/jstrosch/status/1237382986557001729)
View this test on GitHub ↗ Platforms: windows
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Computer Objects
reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
View this test on GitHub ↗ Platforms: windows
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Domain Controller Objects
reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
View this test on GitHub ↗ Platforms: windows
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory OUs
reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
View this test on GitHub ↗ Platforms: windows
Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Trusts
reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
View this test on GitHub ↗ Platforms: windows
Any easy way to bypass AMSI inspection is it patch the dll in memory setting the "amsiInitFailed" function to true.
Upon execution, no output is displayed.
https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2018/06/exploring-powershell-amsi-and-logging-evasion/
View this test on GitHub ↗ Platforms: windows
Patches AmsiScanBuffer in memory using P/Invoke to resolve the function address via
GetModuleHandle/GetProcAddress, then overwrites the prologue with instructions that
return AMSI_RESULT_CLEAN immediately (mov al, 1; ret).
Reference: https://i.blackhat.com/briefings/asia/2018/asia-18-Tal-Liberman-Documenting-the-Undocumented-The-Rise-and-Fall-of-AMSI.pdf
View this test on GitHub ↗ View all validating tests on GitHub → Atomic tests from Atomic Red Team , (c) Red Canary, MIT License . Not affiliated with or endorsed by Red Canary.
News stories naming this group
23 on this site Ransomware claim data is unverified: RansomLook (CC BY 4.0) and ransomware.live (Terms of use: credit and link required).