CYBERSECURITYTRACKER
Incidents

Akira

Review this actor's tracked leak-site claims, published reporting, and attributed threat evidence.

ransomware1,877 leak-site claims, all timeLatest observed leak-site post 2026-11-05

Portable threat brief

Akira

Facts from stored data only; no AI-written text.

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Executive facts

Actor
Akira
Kind
ransomware
Actor record created
2026-07-07
Latest observed
2026-11-05
Leak-site claims
1,877
ATT&CK group
G1024
Catalogued techniques
17
How linked to MITRE:
MITRE's name or alias matches this group

Scope

Tracked sectors
Manufacturing, Construction & Engineering, Business & Professional Services, Legal, Retail
Claim records
2023-04-29 to 2026-11-05
News stories naming this group
2024-09-20 to 2026-11-05

Vulnerability events linked to this group

No dated vulnerability events are attached to this group's linked vulnerabilities.

Verified techniques

Derived only from this actor's stored verified ATT&CK group-to-technique mappings (ATT&CK 20.0); phases are not scored. MITRE group provenance.

Defensive actions

  • M1047Audit6 techniques
  • M1018User Account Management5 techniques
  • M1042Disable or Remove Feature or Program5 techniques
  • M1026Privileged Account Management4 techniques
  • M1038Execution Prevention4 techniques
  • M1017User Training3 techniques
  • M1030Network Segmentation3 techniques
  • M1032Multi-factor Authentication3 techniques
  • M1015Active Directory Configuration2 techniques
  • M1021Restrict Web-Based Content2 techniques

Ransomware claim data is unverified: RansomLook (CC BY 4.0) and ransomware.live (Terms of use: credit and link required).

MITRE ATT&CK names and links © The MITRE Corporation.

Most-claimed sectorsManufacturingConstruction & EngineeringBusiness & Professional ServicesLegalRetail
Activity window in this site's data

This is only the dates observed by this site. It is not this actor's lifetime or evidence of dormancy outside these dates.

Claim records
First observed Latest observed
News stories naming this group
First observed Latest observed
Verified ATT&CK phases represented

Derived only from this actor's stored verified ATT&CK group-to-technique mappings (ATT&CK 20.0); phases are not scored.

Origin and motivation

Origin and motivation not attributed.

Sourced threat-actor profile: MISP Galaxy (Malware Information Sharing Platform)
Also known as
Akira, PUNK SPIDER, GOLD SAHARA

Source: MISP Galaxy, CC0 1.0 Universal or BSD-2-Clause, by an exact match on the name or one of its listed alternate names.

Cited references: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2023/12/20/cryptoguard-an-asymmetric-approach-to-the-ransomware-battle/, https://securelist.com/crimeware-report-fakesg-akira-amos/111483/, https://www.trellix.com/en-us/about/newsroom/stories/research/akira-ransomware.html, https://blog.sekoia.io/sekoia-io-mid-2023-ransomware-threat-landscape, https://decoded.avast.io/threatresearch/avast-q2-2023-threat-report/

Claims posted under this group's name or leak-site brand
1877 on this site
View all on Breaches →
Leak-site claim activity

Claims per month, 2023-04 to 2026-11. Peak 155 in 2026-05.

2023-042026-11
Show monthly counts as a table
MonthClaims
2023-049
2023-0539
2023-0626
2023-0717
2023-0830
2023-099
2023-1013
2023-1119
2023-1217
2024-0126
2024-0216
2024-0317
2024-0417
2024-0521
2024-0620
2024-0731
2024-086
2024-0921
2024-1011
2024-1174
2024-1253
2025-0140
2025-0252
2025-0344
2025-0469
2025-0529
2025-0645
2025-0742
2025-0840
2025-0952
2025-1071
2025-1187
2025-1269
2026-01116
2026-0294
2026-03150
2026-0426
2026-05155
2026-0662
2026-0727
2026-0831
2026-0936
2026-1036
2026-1112

0 additional claims without a disclosure date

Defensive actions

The MITRE ATT&CK mitigations countering the most of this group's known techniques, derived automatically from MITRE's own group and mitigation data. Each links to the full guidance with NIST 800-53 controls and authoritative configuration sources.

All defensive actions for Akira →
Detection rules

SigmaHQ detection rules mapped to this group's MITRE ATT&CK techniques. One technique maps to many rules, so this shows the top few by status and severity, with a link to the full set on SigmaHQ.

Detection rules for AkiraShowing 8 of 181
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp

Detection prerequisites: Log source: antivirus

False positives: Unlikely

Show rule YAML
title: Antivirus - Exploitation Framework Signature
id: 238527ad-3c2c-4e4f-a1f6-92fd63adb864
status: stable
description: |
    Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports an exploitation framework.
    This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/925b0b28472d4d79b4bf92050e38cc2b8f722691c713fc28743ac38551bc3797
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/8f8daabe1c8ceb5710949283818e16c4aa8059bf2ce345e2f2c90b8692978424
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d9669f7e3eb3a9cdf6a750eeb2ba303b5ae148a43e36546896f1d1801e912466
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2018-09-09
modified: 2026-06-15
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    category: antivirus
detection:
    selection:
        Signature|contains:
            - 'ATK/Cobalt'
            - 'Backdoor.Cobalt'
            - 'Beacon'
            - 'Brutel'
            - 'BruteR'
            - 'CbltStr'
            - 'CobaltStr'
            - 'COBALT.SMD'
            - 'COBEACON'
            - 'Cometer'
            - 'Exploit.Script.CVE'
            - 'IISExchgSpawnCMD'
            - 'Metasploit'
            - 'Meterpreter'
            - 'MeteTool'
            - 'Mpreter'
            - 'MsfShell'
            - 'PowerSploit'
            - 'Razy'
            - 'Rozena'
            - 'Sbelt'
            - 'Seatbelt'
            - 'Sliver'
            - 'Swrort'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp

Detection prerequisites: Log source: antivirus

False positives: Unlikely

Show rule YAML
title: Antivirus - Password Dumper Signature
id: 78cc2dd2-7d20-4d32-93ff-057084c38b93
status: stable
description: |
    Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports password dumpers and stealers.
    This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place and check if passwords need to be reset.
references:
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5fcda49ee7f202559a6cbbb34edb65c33c9a1e0bde9fa2af06a6f11b55ded619
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a4edfbd42595d5bddb442c82a02cf0aaa10893c1bf79ea08b9ce576f82749448
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2018-09-09
modified: 2026-06-15
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1558
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
    category: antivirus
detection:
    selection:
        - Signature|startswith: 'PWS'
        - Signature|contains:
              - 'Certify'
              - 'DCSync'
              - 'Creddump'
              - 'DumpCreds'
              - 'DumpLsass'
              - 'DumpPert'
              - 'FormBook'
              - 'HTool/WCE'
              - 'Kekeo'
              - 'Lazagne'
              - 'LsassDump'
              - 'Lummast'
              - 'Mimikatz'
              - 'MultiDump'
              - 'Multiverze'
              - 'Nanodump'
              - 'NativeDump'
              - 'Outflank'
              - 'PShlSpy'
              - 'PSWTool'
              - 'PWCrack'
              - 'PWDump'
              - 'PWS.'
              - 'PWSX'
              - 'pypykatz'
              - 'Rubeus'
              - 'SafetyKatz'
              - 'SecurityTool'
              - 'SharpChrome'
              - 'SharpDPAPI'
              - 'SharpDump'
              - 'SharpKatz'
              - 'SharpS.' # Sharpsploit, e.g. 530ea2ff9049f5dfdfa0a2e9c27c2e3c0685eb6cbdf85370c20a7bfae49f592d
              - 'ShpKatz'
              - 'Steal'
              - 'TrickDump'
              - 'wsass'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)

Detection prerequisites: Platform: windows · Log source: process_creation

False positives: Unknown

Show rule YAML
title: Exploit for CVE-2015-1641
id: 7993792c-5ce2-4475-a3db-a3a5539827ef
status: stable
description: Detects Winword starting uncommon sub process MicroScMgmt.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2015-1641
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/5567408950b744c4e846ba8ae726883cb15268a539f3bb21758a466e47021ae8/analysis/
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/5567408950b744c4e846ba8ae726883cb15268a539f3bb21758a466e47021ae8?environmentId=100
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-02-22
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
    - cve.2015-1641
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\WINWORD.EXE'
        Image|endswith: '\MicroScMgmt.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)

Detection prerequisites: Platform: windows · Log source: process_creation

False positives: Unlikely

Show rule YAML
title: HackTool - Rubeus Execution
id: 7ec2c172-dceb-4c10-92c9-87c1881b7e18
related:
    - id: 7ec2c172-dceb-4c10-92c9-87c1881b7e18
      type: similar
status: stable
description: Detects the execution of the hacktool Rubeus via PE information of command line parameters
references:
    - https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/from-kekeo-to-rubeus
    - https://m0chan.github.io/2019/07/31/How-To-Attack-Kerberos-101.html
    - https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-12-19
modified: 2023-04-20
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
    - attack.t1558.003
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1550.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Image|endswith: '\Rubeus.exe'
        - OriginalFileName: 'Rubeus.exe'
        - Description: 'Rubeus'
        - CommandLine|contains:
              - 'asreproast '
              - 'dump /service:krbtgt '
              - 'dump /luid:0x'
              - 'kerberoast '
              - 'createnetonly /program:'
              - 'ptt /ticket:'
              - '/impersonateuser:'
              - 'renew /ticket:'
              - 'asktgt /user:'
              - 'harvest /interval:'
              - 's4u /user:'
              - 's4u /ticket:'
              - 'hash /password:'
              - 'golden /aes256:'
              - 'silver /user:'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
Author: Vasiliy Burov, oscd.community

Detection prerequisites: Platform: windows · Log source: process_creation

False positives: Unlikely

Show rule YAML
title: LockerGoga Ransomware Activity
id: 74db3488-fd28-480a-95aa-b7af626de068
status: stable
description: Detects LockerGoga ransomware activity via specific command line.
references:
    - https://medium.com/@malwaredancer/lockergoga-input-arguments-ipc-communication-and-others-bd4e5a7ba80a
    - https://blog.f-secure.com/analysis-of-lockergoga-ransomware/
    - https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/
author: Vasiliy Burov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-18
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1486
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: '-i SM-tgytutrc -s'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
Author: Sittikorn S

Detection prerequisites: Platform: aws · Service: cloudtrail

False positives: System or Network administrator behaviors; DEV, UAT, SAT environment. You should apply this rule with PROD environment only.

Show rule YAML
title: AWS SecurityHub Findings Evasion
id: a607e1fe-74bf-4440-a3ec-b059b9103157
status: stable
description: Detects the modification of the findings on SecurityHub.
references:
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/securityhub/
author: Sittikorn S
date: 2021-06-28
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: securityhub.amazonaws.com
        eventName:
            - 'BatchUpdateFindings'
            - 'DeleteInsight'
            - 'UpdateFindings'
            - 'UpdateInsight'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - System or Network administrator behaviors
    - DEV, UAT, SAT environment. You should apply this rule with PROD environment only.
level: high
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
Author: Thomas Patzke

Detection prerequisites: Platform: windows · Log source: process_creation

False positives: Unknown

Show rule YAML
title: HackTool - CrackMapExec Execution Patterns
id: 058f4380-962d-40a5-afce-50207d36d7e2
status: stable
description: Detects various execution patterns of the CrackMapExec pentesting framework
references:
    - https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2023-11-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1053
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.s0106
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # cme/protocols/smb/wmiexec.py (generalized execute_remote and execute_fileless)
            - 'cmd.exe /Q /c * 1> \\\\*\\*\\* 2>&1'
            # cme/protocols/smb/atexec.py:109 (fileless output via share)
            - 'cmd.exe /C * > \\\\*\\*\\* 2>&1'
            # cme/protocols/smb/atexec.py:111 (fileless output via share)
            - 'cmd.exe /C * > *\\Temp\\* 2>&1'
            # https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/d8c50c8cbaf36c29329078662473f75e440978d2/cme/helpers/powershell.py#L136 (PowerShell execution with obfuscation)
            - 'powershell.exe -exec bypass -noni -nop -w 1 -C "'
            # https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/d8c50c8cbaf36c29329078662473f75e440978d2/cme/helpers/powershell.py#L160 (PowerShell execution without obfuscation)
            - 'powershell.exe -noni -nop -w 1 -enc '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
Author: Bhabesh Raj, Nasreddine Bencherchali

Detection prerequisites: Platform: windows · Service: windefend

False positives: Administrator might try to disable defender features during testing (must be investigated)

Show rule YAML
title: Microsoft Defender Tamper Protection Trigger
id: 49e5bc24-8b86-49f1-b743-535f332c2856
status: stable
description: Detects blocked attempts to change any of Defender's settings such as "Real Time Monitoring" and "Behavior Monitoring"
references:
    - https://bhabeshraj.com/post/tampering-with-microsoft-defenders-tamper-protection
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/troubleshoot-microsoft-defender-antivirus?view=o365-worldwide
author: Bhabesh Raj, Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2021-07-05
modified: 2022-12-06
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: windefend
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5013 # Tamper protection blocked a change to Microsoft Defender Antivirus. If Tamper protection is enabled then, any attempt to change any of Defender's settings is blocked. Event ID 5013 is generated and states which setting change was blocked.
        Value|endswith:
            - '\Windows Defender\DisableAntiSpyware'
            - '\Windows Defender\DisableAntiVirus'
            - '\Windows Defender\Scan\DisableArchiveScanning'
            - '\Windows Defender\Scan\DisableScanningNetworkFiles'
            - '\Real-Time Protection\DisableRealtimeMonitoring'
            - '\Real-Time Protection\DisableBehaviorMonitoring'
            - '\Real-Time Protection\DisableIOAVProtection'
            - '\Real-Time Protection\DisableScriptScanning'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Administrator might try to disable defender features during testing (must be investigated)
level: high
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
View all detecting rules on SigmaHQ →

Detection rules licensed under Detection Rule License (DRL) 1.1, from SigmaHQ. Each rule retains its author.

Validation tests

Atomic Red Team validating tests mapped to this group's MITRE ATT&CK techniques, shown beside the detection rules so you can validate the detections. This shows the top few, with a link to the full set on GitHub. Descriptive metadata only, never the attack commands.

Validating tests for AkiraShowing 8 of 141
Platforms: windows

Red teamer's avoid IEX and Invoke-WebRequest in your PowerShell commands. Instead, host a text record with a payload to compromise hosts. [reference](https://twitter.com/jstrosch/status/1237382986557001729)

View this test on GitHub ↗
Platforms: windows

Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Computer Objects reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html

View this test on GitHub ↗
Platforms: windows

Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Domain Controller Objects reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html

View this test on GitHub ↗
Platforms: windows

Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory OUs reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html

View this test on GitHub ↗
Platforms: windows

Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Trusts reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html

View this test on GitHub ↗
Platforms: windows

Any easy way to bypass AMSI inspection is it patch the dll in memory setting the "amsiInitFailed" function to true. Upon execution, no output is displayed. https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2018/06/exploring-powershell-amsi-and-logging-evasion/

View this test on GitHub ↗
Platforms: windows

Patches AmsiScanBuffer in memory using P/Invoke to resolve the function address via GetModuleHandle/GetProcAddress, then overwrites the prologue with instructions that return AMSI_RESULT_CLEAN immediately (mov al, 1; ret). Reference: https://i.blackhat.com/briefings/asia/2018/asia-18-Tal-Liberman-Documenting-the-Undocumented-The-Rise-and-Fall-of-AMSI.pdf

View this test on GitHub ↗
Platforms: windows

Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -Command parameter

View this test on GitHub ↗
View all validating tests on GitHub →

Atomic tests from Atomic Red Team, (c) Red Canary, MIT License. Not affiliated with or endorsed by Red Canary.

News stories naming this group
23 on this site

Ransomware claim data is unverified: RansomLook (CC BY 4.0) and ransomware.live (Terms of use: credit and link required).

Glossary