CYBERSECURITYTRACKER
Incidents

INC Ransom

Review this actor's tracked leak-site claims, published reporting, and attributed threat evidence.

ransomware982 leak-site claims, all timeLatest observed leak-site post 2026-11-03
aka incransom
Names and spellings merged by the site editor: inc-ransom, incransom.

Portable threat brief

INC Ransom

Facts from stored data only; no AI-written text.

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Executive facts

Actor
INC Ransom
Kind
ransomware
Aliases
incransom
Actor record created
2026-07-03
Latest observed
2026-11-03
Leak-site claims
982
ATT&CK group
G1032
Catalogued techniques
25
How linked to MITRE:
MITRE's name or alias matches this group

Scope

Tracked sectors
Healthcare, Legal, Manufacturing, Education, Government
Claim records
2023-08-09 to 2026-11-03

Vulnerability events linked to this group

No dated vulnerability events are attached to this group's linked vulnerabilities.

Verified techniques

Derived only from this actor's stored verified ATT&CK group-to-technique mappings (ATT&CK 20.0); phases are not scored. MITRE group provenance.

Defensive actions

  • M1018User Account Management6 techniques
  • M1031Network Intrusion Prevention6 techniques
  • M1037Filter Network Traffic6 techniques
  • M1026Privileged Account Management5 techniques
  • M1038Execution Prevention5 techniques
  • M1042Disable or Remove Feature or Program4 techniques
  • M1047Audit4 techniques
  • M1017User Training3 techniques
  • M1022Restrict File and Directory Permissions3 techniques
  • M1028Operating System Configuration3 techniques

Ransomware claim data is unverified: RansomLook (CC BY 4.0) and ransomware.live (Terms of use: credit and link required).

MITRE ATT&CK names and links © The MITRE Corporation.

Most-claimed sectorsHealthcareLegalManufacturingEducationGovernment
Activity window in this site's data

This is only the dates observed by this site. It is not this actor's lifetime or evidence of dormancy outside these dates.

Claim records
First observed Latest observed
Verified ATT&CK phases represented

Derived only from this actor's stored verified ATT&CK group-to-technique mappings (ATT&CK 20.0); phases are not scored.

Origin and motivation

Origin and motivation not attributed.

Claims posted under this group's name or leak-site brand
982 on this site
View all on Breaches →
Leak-site claim activity

Claims per month, 2023-08 to 2026-11. Peak 56 in 2026-03.

2023-082026-11
Show monthly counts as a table
MonthClaims
2023-083
2023-0911
2023-1010
2023-1115
2023-127
2024-019
2024-024
2024-0313
2024-0415
2024-0537
2024-0619
2024-0713
2024-087
2024-0911
2024-103
2024-1126
2024-128
2025-0128
2025-0213
2025-0328
2025-0418
2025-0519
2025-0626
2025-0755
2025-0824
2025-0938
2025-1030
2025-1154
2025-1235
2026-0144
2026-0241
2026-0356
2026-0440
2026-0532
2026-0632
2026-0738
2026-0848
2026-0936
2026-1030
2026-116

0 additional claims without a disclosure date

Defensive actions

The MITRE ATT&CK mitigations countering the most of this group's known techniques, derived automatically from MITRE's own group and mitigation data. Each links to the full guidance with NIST 800-53 controls and authoritative configuration sources.

All defensive actions for INC Ransom →
Detection rules

SigmaHQ detection rules mapped to this group's MITRE ATT&CK techniques. One technique maps to many rules, so this shows the top few by status and severity, with a link to the full set on SigmaHQ.

Detection rules for INC RansomShowing 8 of 262
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp

Detection prerequisites: Log source: antivirus

False positives: Unlikely

Show rule YAML
title: Antivirus - Exploitation Framework Signature
id: 238527ad-3c2c-4e4f-a1f6-92fd63adb864
status: stable
description: |
    Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports an exploitation framework.
    This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/925b0b28472d4d79b4bf92050e38cc2b8f722691c713fc28743ac38551bc3797
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/8f8daabe1c8ceb5710949283818e16c4aa8059bf2ce345e2f2c90b8692978424
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d9669f7e3eb3a9cdf6a750eeb2ba303b5ae148a43e36546896f1d1801e912466
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2018-09-09
modified: 2026-06-15
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1219.002
logsource:
    category: antivirus
detection:
    selection:
        Signature|contains:
            - 'ATK/Cobalt'
            - 'Backdoor.Cobalt'
            - 'Beacon'
            - 'Brutel'
            - 'BruteR'
            - 'CbltStr'
            - 'CobaltStr'
            - 'COBALT.SMD'
            - 'COBEACON'
            - 'Cometer'
            - 'Exploit.Script.CVE'
            - 'IISExchgSpawnCMD'
            - 'Metasploit'
            - 'Meterpreter'
            - 'MeteTool'
            - 'Mpreter'
            - 'MsfShell'
            - 'PowerSploit'
            - 'Razy'
            - 'Rozena'
            - 'Sbelt'
            - 'Seatbelt'
            - 'Sliver'
            - 'Swrort'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)

Detection prerequisites: Platform: windows · Log source: process_creation

False positives: Unknown

Show rule YAML
title: Droppers Exploiting CVE-2017-11882
id: 678eb5f4-8597-4be6-8be7-905e4234b53a
status: stable
description: Detects exploits that use CVE-2017-11882 to start EQNEDT32.EXE and other sub processes like mshta.exe
references:
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/2a4ae284c76f868fc51d3bb65da8caa6efacb707f265b25c30f34250b76b7507?environmentId=100
    - https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/exploit-available-dangerous-ms-office-rce-vuln-called-thebenygreen-
    - https://github.com/embedi/CVE-2017-11882
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2017-11-23
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1203
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
    - cve.2017-11882
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\EQNEDT32.EXE'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)

Detection prerequisites: Platform: windows · Log source: process_creation

False positives: Unknown

Show rule YAML
title: Exploit for CVE-2015-1641
id: 7993792c-5ce2-4475-a3db-a3a5539827ef
status: stable
description: Detects Winword starting uncommon sub process MicroScMgmt.exe as used in exploits for CVE-2015-1641
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/5567408950b744c4e846ba8ae726883cb15268a539f3bb21758a466e47021ae8/analysis/
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/5567408950b744c4e846ba8ae726883cb15268a539f3bb21758a466e47021ae8?environmentId=100
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-02-22
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1036.005
    - cve.2015-1641
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\WINWORD.EXE'
        Image|endswith: '\MicroScMgmt.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
Author: Vasiliy Burov, oscd.community

Detection prerequisites: Platform: windows · Log source: process_creation

False positives: Unlikely

Show rule YAML
title: LockerGoga Ransomware Activity
id: 74db3488-fd28-480a-95aa-b7af626de068
status: stable
description: Detects LockerGoga ransomware activity via specific command line.
references:
    - https://medium.com/@malwaredancer/lockergoga-input-arguments-ipc-communication-and-others-bd4e5a7ba80a
    - https://blog.f-secure.com/analysis-of-lockergoga-ransomware/
    - https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/
author: Vasiliy Burov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-18
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1486
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: '-i SM-tgytutrc -s'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)

Detection prerequisites: Platform: windows · Log source: process_creation

False positives: Unlikely

Show rule YAML
title: Potential Dridex Activity
id: e6eb5a96-9e6f-4a18-9cdd-642cfda21c8e
status: stable
description: Detects potential Dridex acitvity via specific process patterns
references:
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/993daa5e-112a-4ff6-8b5a-edbcec7c7ba3
    - https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/dridex/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-01-10
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1055
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1135
    - attack.t1033
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_svchost:
        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - 'C:\Users\'
            - '\Desktop\'
    filter_svchost:
        ParentImage|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\'
    selection_regsvr:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\excel.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ' -s '
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
    filter_regsvr:
        CommandLine|contains: '.dll'
    selection_anomaly_parent:
        ParentImage|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
    selection_anomaly_child_1:
        Image|endswith: '\whoami.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: ' /all'
    selection_anomaly_child_2:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\net.exe'
            - '\net1.exe'
        CommandLine|contains: ' view'
    condition: (selection_svchost and not filter_svchost) or (selection_regsvr and not filter_regsvr) or (selection_anomaly_parent and 1 of selection_anomaly_child_*)
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
Author: Thomas Patzke

Detection prerequisites: Log source: proxy

False positives: Unknown

Show rule YAML
title: Ursnif Malware C2 URL Pattern
id: 932ac737-33ca-4afd-9869-0d48b391fcc9
status: stable
description: Detects Ursnif C2 traffic.
references:
    - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/ursnif-variant-spreading-word-document.html
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2019-12-19
modified: 2021-08-09
tags:
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.t1566.001
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1071.001
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: proxy
detection:
    b64encoding:
        c-uri|contains:
            - '_2f'
            - '_2b'
    urlpatterns:
        c-uri|contains|all:
            - '.avi'
            - '/images/'
    condition: b64encoding and urlpatterns
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
Author: Sittikorn S

Detection prerequisites: Platform: aws · Service: cloudtrail

False positives: System or Network administrator behaviors; DEV, UAT, SAT environment. You should apply this rule with PROD environment only.

Show rule YAML
title: AWS SecurityHub Findings Evasion
id: a607e1fe-74bf-4440-a3ec-b059b9103157
status: stable
description: Detects the modification of the findings on SecurityHub.
references:
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/securityhub/
author: Sittikorn S
date: 2021-06-28
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: securityhub.amazonaws.com
        eventName:
            - 'BatchUpdateFindings'
            - 'DeleteInsight'
            - 'UpdateFindings'
            - 'UpdateInsight'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - System or Network administrator behaviors
    - DEV, UAT, SAT environment. You should apply this rule with PROD environment only.
level: high
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
Author: Thomas Patzke

Detection prerequisites: Platform: windows · Log source: process_creation

False positives: Unknown

Show rule YAML
title: HackTool - CrackMapExec Execution Patterns
id: 058f4380-962d-40a5-afce-50207d36d7e2
status: stable
description: Detects various execution patterns of the CrackMapExec pentesting framework
references:
    - https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2023-11-06
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1053
    - attack.t1059.003
    - attack.t1059.001
    - attack.s0106
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains:
            # cme/protocols/smb/wmiexec.py (generalized execute_remote and execute_fileless)
            - 'cmd.exe /Q /c * 1> \\\\*\\*\\* 2>&1'
            # cme/protocols/smb/atexec.py:109 (fileless output via share)
            - 'cmd.exe /C * > \\\\*\\*\\* 2>&1'
            # cme/protocols/smb/atexec.py:111 (fileless output via share)
            - 'cmd.exe /C * > *\\Temp\\* 2>&1'
            # https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/d8c50c8cbaf36c29329078662473f75e440978d2/cme/helpers/powershell.py#L136 (PowerShell execution with obfuscation)
            - 'powershell.exe -exec bypass -noni -nop -w 1 -C "'
            # https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/d8c50c8cbaf36c29329078662473f75e440978d2/cme/helpers/powershell.py#L160 (PowerShell execution without obfuscation)
            - 'powershell.exe -noni -nop -w 1 -enc '
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
View all detecting rules on SigmaHQ →

Detection rules licensed under Detection Rule License (DRL) 1.1, from SigmaHQ. Each rule retains its author.

Validation tests

Atomic Red Team validating tests mapped to this group's MITRE ATT&CK techniques, shown beside the detection rules so you can validate the detections. This shows the top few, with a link to the full set on GitHub. Descriptive metadata only, never the attack commands.

Validating tests for INC RansomShowing 8 of 206
Platforms: linux

This test uses LDAPDomainDump to perform account enumeration on a domain. [Reference](https://securityonline.info/ldapdomaindump-active-directory-information-dumper-via-ldap/)

View this test on GitHub ↗
Platforms: linux

Output information from LDAPSearch. LDAP Password is the admin-user password on Active Directory

View this test on GitHub ↗
Platforms: linux

Output information from LDAPSearch. LDAP Password is the admin-user password on Active Directory

View this test on GitHub ↗
Platforms: windows

Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Admin accounts reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://stealthbits.com/blog/fun-with-active-directorys-admincount-attribute/

View this test on GitHub ↗
Platforms: windows

Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Exchange Objects reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html

View this test on GitHub ↗
Platforms: windows

Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory User Objects reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html

View this test on GitHub ↗
Platforms: windows

Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Groups reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html

View this test on GitHub ↗
Platforms: windows

Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. The example chosen illustrates adfind used to query the local password policy. reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/7535.adfind-command-examples.aspx

View this test on GitHub ↗
View all validating tests on GitHub →

Atomic tests from Atomic Red Team, (c) Red Canary, MIT License. Not affiliated with or endorsed by Red Canary.

Ransomware claim data is unverified: RansomLook (CC BY 4.0) and ransomware.live (Terms of use: credit and link required).

Glossary