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Threat actor

Qilin

ransomware985 leak-site claims, all timeLatest observed leak-site post 2026-09-11MITRE ATT&CK G1050 ↗ORKL search ↗

Portable threat brief

Qilin

Versioned profile fields only · no model narrative

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Executive facts

Actor
Qilin
Kind
ransomware
Actor record created
2026-07-06
Latest observed
2026-09-11
Leak-site claims
985
ATT&CK group
G1050
Catalogued techniques
3
Mapping basis
description

Scope

Tracked sectors
Manufacturing, Business & Professional Services, Construction & Engineering, Retail, Healthcare
Claim records
2026-01-02 to 2026-09-11
Independent reporting
2025-06-23 to 2026-09-10

Decisive signals with dates

No dated decisive signals are attached to this actor's linked vulnerabilities.

Verified techniques

Derived only from this actor's stored verified ATT&CK group-to-technique mappings (ATT&CK 19.2); phases are not scored. MITRE group provenance.

Defensive actions

  • M1017User Training1 technique
  • M1018User Account Management1 technique
  • M1040Behavior Prevention on Endpoint1 technique
  • M1053Data Backup1 technique
  • M1056Pre-compromise1 technique

Ransomware claim data is unverified: RansomLook (CC BY 4.0) and ransomware.live (No data licence; credited voluntarily).

MITRE ATT&CK names and links © The MITRE Corporation.

Most-claimed sectorsManufacturingBusiness & Professional ServicesConstruction & EngineeringRetailHealthcare
Activity window in this corpus

This is only the tracker's observed corpus window. It is not this actor's lifetime or evidence of dormancy outside these dates.

Claim records
First observed Latest observed
Independent reporting
First observed Latest observed
Verified ATT&CK phases represented

Derived only from this actor's stored verified ATT&CK group-to-technique mappings (ATT&CK 19.2); phases are not scored.

Origin and motivation

Origin and motivation not attributed.

Claims attributed to this actor or leak site
985 in this corpus
View all on Breaches →
Leak-site claim activity

0 additional claims without a disclosure date

2026-012026-09
Defensive actions

The MITRE ATT&CK mitigations countering the most of this group's known techniques, derived automatically from MITRE's own group and mitigation data. Each links to the full guidance with NIST 800-53 controls and authoritative configuration sources.

All defensive actions for Qilin →
Detection rules

SigmaHQ detection rules mapped to this group's MITRE ATT&CK techniques. One technique maps to many rules, so this shows the top few by status and severity, with a link to the full set on SigmaHQ.

Detection rules for QilinShowing 8 of 14
Author: Vasiliy Burov, oscd.community

Detection prerequisites: Platform: windows · Log source: process_creation

False positives: Unlikely

title: LockerGoga Ransomware Activity
id: 74db3488-fd28-480a-95aa-b7af626de068
status: stable
description: Detects LockerGoga ransomware activity via specific command line.
references:
    - https://medium.com/@malwaredancer/lockergoga-input-arguments-ipc-communication-and-others-bd4e5a7ba80a
    - https://blog.f-secure.com/analysis-of-lockergoga-ransomware/
    - https://www.carbonblack.com/blog/tau-threat-intelligence-notification-lockergoga-ransomware/
author: Vasiliy Burov, oscd.community
date: 2020-10-18
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1486
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains: '-i SM-tgytutrc -s'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
Author: Sittikorn S

Detection prerequisites: Platform: aws · Service: cloudtrail

False positives: System Administrator Activities; DEV, UAT, SAT environment. You should apply this rule with PROD account only.

title: AWS EC2 Disable EBS Encryption
id: 16124c2d-e40b-4fcc-8f2c-5ab7870a2223
status: stable
description: |
  Identifies disabling of default Amazon Elastic Block Store (EBS) encryption in the current region.
  Disabling default encryption does not change the encryption status of your existing volumes.
references:
    - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DisableEbsEncryptionByDefault.html
author: Sittikorn S
date: 2021-06-29
modified: 2021-08-20
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1486
    - attack.t1565
logsource:
    product: aws
    service: cloudtrail
detection:
    selection:
        eventSource: ec2.amazonaws.com
        eventName: DisableEbsEncryptionByDefault
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - System Administrator Activities
    - DEV, UAT, SAT environment. You should apply this rule with PROD account only.
level: medium
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp

Detection prerequisites: Log source: antivirus

False positives: Unlikely

title: Antivirus - Ransomware Signature
id: 4c6ca276-d4d0-4a8c-9e4c-d69832f8671f
status: test
description: |
    Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports ransomware.
    This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place.
references:
    - https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/43b0f7872900bd234975a0877744554f4f355dc57505517abd1ef611e1ce6916
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c312c05ddbd227cbb08958876df2b69d0f7c1b09e5689eb9d93c5b357f63eff7
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/20179093c59bca3acc6ce9a4281e8462f577ffd29fd7bf51cf2a70d106062045
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/554db97ea82f17eba516e6a6fdb9dc04b1d25580a1eb8cb755eeb260ad0bd61d
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/69fe77dd558e281621418980040e2af89a2547d377d0f2875502005ce22bc95c
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/6f0f20da34396166df352bf301b3c59ef42b0bc67f52af3d541b0161c47ede05
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2022-05-12
modified: 2026-06-15
tags:
    - attack.t1486
    - attack.impact
logsource:
    category: antivirus
detection:
    selection:
        Signature|contains:
            - 'Babuk'
            - 'Babyk'
            - 'BlackWorm'
            - 'Chaos'
            - 'Cobra'
            - 'ContiCrypt'
            - 'Crypter'
            - 'Cryptes'
            - 'Cryptor'
            - 'CylanCrypt'
            - 'DelShad'
            - 'Destructor'
            - 'Filecoder'
            - 'GandCrab'
            - 'GrandCrab'
            - 'Haperlock'
            - 'Hiddentear'
            - 'HydraCrypt'
            - 'Krypt'
            - 'Lockbit'
            - 'Locker'
            - 'Mallox'
            - 'Medusa'
            - 'Phobos'
            - 'Ransom'
            - 'Rook'
            - 'Ryuk'
            - 'Ryzerlo'
            - 'Stopcrypt'
            - 'Tescrypt'
            - 'TeslaCrypt'
            - 'WannaCry'
            - 'Xorist'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
Author: frack113

Detection prerequisites: Platform: windows · Log source: process_creation

False positives: Unlikely

title: Potential Conti Ransomware Activity
id: 689308fc-cfba-4f72-9897-796c1dc61487
status: test
description: Detects a specific command used by the Conti ransomware group
references:
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/09/03/conti-affiliates-use-proxyshell-exchange-exploit-in-ransomware-attacks/
    - https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1447795359900704769?t=Xz7vaLTvaaCZ5kHoZa6gMw&s=19
author: frack113
date: 2021-10-12
modified: 2023-02-13
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.s0575
    - attack.t1486
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '-m '
            - '-net '
            - '-size ' # Size 10 in references
            - '-nomutex '
            - '-p \\\\'
            - '$'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: critical
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tom U. @c_APT_ure (collection), oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro

Detection prerequisites: Platform: windows · Log source: process_creation

False positives: Unknown

title: WannaCry Ransomware Activity
id: 41d40bff-377a-43e2-8e1b-2e543069e079
status: test
description: Detects WannaCry ransomware activity
references:
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa?environmentId=100
    - https://x.com/nas_bench/status/1868639048484425963
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tom U. @c_APT_ure (collection), oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2025-10-18
tags:
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1210
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.t1083
    - attack.t1222.001
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1486
    - attack.t1490
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\tasksche.exe'
              - '\mssecsvc.exe'
              - '\taskdl.exe'
              - '\taskhsvc.exe'
              - '\taskse.exe'
              - '\111.exe'
              - '\lhdfrgui.exe'
              # - '\diskpart.exe'  # cannot be used in a rule of level critical
              - '\linuxnew.exe'
              - '\wannacry.exe'
        - Image|contains: 'WanaDecryptor'
    selection_cmd:
        CommandLine|contains: '@Please_Read_Me@.txt'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: critical
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
Author: j4son

Detection prerequisites: Platform: windows · Service: security

False positives: Unknown

title: BlueSky Ransomware Artefacts
id: eee8311f-a752-44f0-bf2f-6b007db16300
status: test
description: Detect access to files and shares with names and extensions used by BlueSky ransomware which could indicate a current or previous encryption attempt.
references:
    - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/bluesky-ransomware/
author: j4son
date: 2023-05-23
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1486
    - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection_access_eid:
        EventID:
            - 4663
            - 4656
    selection_access_data:
        - ObjectName|endswith: '.bluesky'
        - ObjectName|contains: 'DECRYPT FILES BLUESKY'
    selection_share_eid:
        EventID: 5145
    selection_share_data:
        - RelativeTargetName|endswith: '.bluesky'
        - RelativeTargetName|contains: 'DECRYPT FILES BLUESKY'
    condition: all of selection_access_* or all of selection_share_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
Author: Luc Génaux

Detection prerequisites: Platform: windows · Log source: image_load

False positives: Processes related to software installation

title: Load Of RstrtMgr.DLL By A Suspicious Process
id: b48492dc-c5ef-4572-8dff-32bc241c15c8
related:
    - id: 3669afd2-9891-4534-a626-e5cf03810a61
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects the load of RstrtMgr DLL (Restart Manager) by a suspicious process.
    This library has been used during ransomware campaigns to kill processes that would prevent file encryption by locking them (e.g. Conti ransomware, Cactus ransomware). It has also recently been seen used by the BiBi wiper for Windows.
    It could also be used for anti-analysis purposes by shut downing specific processes.
references:
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/windows-restart-manager-part-1/
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/windows-restart-manager-part-2/
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20231221193106/https://www.swascan.com/cactus-ransomware-malware-analysis/
    - https://taiwan.postsen.com/business/88601/Hamas-hackers-use-data-destruction-software-BiBi-which-consumes-a-lot-of-processor-resources-to-wipe-Windows-computer-data--iThome.html
author: Luc Génaux
date: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1486
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - ImageLoaded|endswith: '\RstrtMgr.dll'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RstrtMgr.dll'
    selection_folders_1:
        Image|contains:
            # Note: increase coverage by adding more suspicious paths
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - '\Temporary Internet'
    selection_folders_2:
        - Image|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favorites\'
        - Image|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favourites\'
        - Image|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Contacts\'
    condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_folders_*
falsepositives:
    - Processes related to software installation
level: high
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113

Detection prerequisites: Platform: windows · Log source: process_creation

False positives: Not provided by SigmaHQ.

title: Renamed Gpg.EXE Execution
id: ec0722a3-eb5c-4a56-8ab2-bf6f20708592
status: test
description: Detects the execution of a renamed "gpg.exe". Often used by ransomware and loaders to decrypt/encrypt data.
references:
    - https://securelist.com/locked-out/68960/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113
date: 2023-08-09
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.t1486
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        OriginalFileName: 'gpg.exe'
    filter_main_img:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\gpg.exe'
            - '\gpg2.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
level: high
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗
View all detecting rules on SigmaHQ →

Detection rules licensed under Detection Rule License (DRL) 1.1, from SigmaHQ. Each rule retains its author.

Validation tests

Atomic Red Team validating tests mapped to this group's MITRE ATT&CK techniques, shown beside the detection rules so you can validate the detections. This shows the top few, with a link to the full set on GitHub. Descriptive metadata only, never the attack commands.

Validating tests for QilinShowing 8 of 10
Platforms: windows

Gpg4win is a Windows tool (also called Kleopatra which is the preferred certificate manager) that uses email and file encryption packages for symmetric encryption. It is used by attackers to encrypt disks. User will need to add pass phrase to encrypt file as automation is not allowed under newer versions.

View this test on GitHub ↗
Platforms: macos

This test encrypts the file(s) using the 7z utility

View this test on GitHub ↗
Platforms: linux

Attempts to encrypt data on target systems as root to simulate an interruption authentication to target system. If root permissions are not available then attempts to encrypt data within user's home directory.

View this test on GitHub ↗
Platforms: macos

This test encrypts the file(s) using the openssl utility

View this test on GitHub ↗
Platforms: windows

Dropping 100 files with random content and .akira File Extension and the Akira Ransomnote to c:\

View this test on GitHub ↗
View all validating tests on GitHub →

Atomic tests from Atomic Red Team, (c) Red Canary, MIT License. Not affiliated with or endorsed by Red Canary.

Independent reporting that mentions this actor
33 in this corpus

Ransomware claim data is unverified: RansomLook (CC BY 4.0) and ransomware.live (No data licence; credited voluntarily).

Glossary