As cited
Copy frozen at (site build).
threat intel
Tracking Shai-Hulud: Inside the ChainDrop NPM Worm
On August 4, 2026, the ChainDrop self-propagating worm compromised the keyv npm maintainer account and injected malicious code into GitHub repositories, triggering legitimate CI/CD pipelines to publish over 400 poisoned packages with valid Sigstore provenance attestations. The worm steals developer credentials and republishes infected versions of every accessible package, using an Ethereum smart contract to rotate command-and-control domains and evading domain-based blocklists. ChainDrop plants persistence hooks in Visual Studio Code and Claude Code configuration files that execute when developers open projects, surviving package removal and bypassing the --ignore-scripts mitigation.
Why it matters: Developers and DevOps teams using npm, GitHub, and mainstream IDEs are at risk of credential theft, home directory wipes upon token revocation, and supply chain compromise across hundreds of downstream packages; practitioners must validate that SLSA provenance proves build integrity, not source safety, and implement strict lockfiles, phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA), and anomaly detection on publishing behavior.
- Source published
- First seen by Cybersecurity Tracker
Source attribution
Correction
Correction recorded as of .
threat intel
Tracking Shai-Hulud: Inside the ChainDrop NPM Worm
On August 4, 2026, the ChainDrop self-propagating worm compromised the keyv npm maintainer account and injected malicious code into GitHub repositories, triggering legitimate CI/CD pipelines to publish over 400 poisoned packages with valid Sigstore provenance attestations. The worm steals developer credentials and republishes infected versions of every accessible package, using an Ethereum smart contract to rotate command-and-control domains and evading domain-based blocklists. ChainDrop plants persistence hooks in Visual Studio Code and Claude Code configuration files that execute when developers open projects, surviving package removal and bypassing the --ignore-scripts mitigation.
Why it matters: Developers and DevOps teams using npm, GitHub, and mainstream IDEs are at risk of credential theft, home directory wipes upon token revocation, and supply chain compromise across hundreds of downstream packages; practitioners must validate that SLSA provenance proves build integrity, not source safety, and implement strict lockfiles, phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA), and anomaly detection on publishing behavior.
- Source published
- First seen by Cybersecurity Tracker
Source attribution
Correction
Correction recorded as of .
threat intel
Tracking Shai-Hulud: Inside the ChainDrop NPM Worm
On August 4, 2026, the ChainDrop self-propagating worm compromised the keyv npm maintainer account and injected malicious code into GitHub repositories, triggering legitimate CI/CD pipelines to publish over 400 poisoned packages with valid Sigstore provenance attestations. The worm steals developer credentials and republishes infected versions of every accessible package, using an Ethereum smart contract to rotate command-and-control domains and evading domain-based blocklists. ChainDrop plants persistence hooks in Visual Studio Code and Claude Code configuration files that execute when developers open projects, surviving package removal and bypassing the --ignore-scripts mitigation.
Why it matters: Developers and DevOps teams using npm, GitHub, and mainstream IDEs are at risk of credential theft, home directory wipes upon token revocation, and supply chain compromise across hundreds of downstream packages; practitioners must validate that SLSA provenance proves build integrity, not source safety, and implement strict lockfiles, phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA), and anomaly detection on publishing behavior.
- Source published
- First seen by Cybersecurity Tracker