Play
Origin and motivation not attributed.
- Record Go AlquilerUnclassified2026-07-23source ↗
- Restaurant DepotRetail2026-07-23source ↗
- The DeBrulerUnclassified2026-07-23source ↗
- Tax MTBusiness & Professional Services2026-07-22source ↗
- Kreysler & AssociatesUnclassified2026-07-22source ↗
- Kreysler & AssociatesBusiness & Professional Services2026-07-21source ↗
- Tax MTBusiness & Professional Services2026-07-21source ↗
- Boston Electric and TelephoneTelecommunications2026-07-16source ↗
- Wring GroupUnclassified2026-07-16source ↗
- AG ScholtesUnclassified2026-07-16source ↗
The MITRE ATT&CK mitigations countering the most of this group's known techniques, derived automatically from MITRE's own group and mitigation data. Each links to the full guidance with NIST 800-53 controls and authoritative configuration sources.
- M1026Privileged Account Management7 techniques
- M1018User Account Management6 techniques
- M1027Password Policies5 techniques
- M1017User Training4 techniques
- M1032Multi-factor Authentication4 techniques
- M1037Filter Network Traffic4 techniques
- M1022Restrict File and Directory Permissions3 techniques
- M1030Network Segmentation3 techniques
- M1031Network Intrusion Prevention3 techniques
- M1035Limit Access to Resource Over Network3 techniques
SigmaHQ detection rules mapped to this group's MITRE ATT&CK techniques. One technique maps to many rules, so this shows the top few by status and severity, with a link to the full set on SigmaHQ.
title: Antivirus - Password Dumper Signature
id: 78cc2dd2-7d20-4d32-93ff-057084c38b93
status: stable
description: |
Detects a highly relevant Antivirus alert that reports password dumpers and stealers.
This event must not be ignored just because the AV has blocked the malware but investigate, how it came there in the first place and check if passwords need to be reset.
references:
- https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5fcda49ee7f202559a6cbbb34edb65c33c9a1e0bde9fa2af06a6f11b55ded619
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a4edfbd42595d5bddb442c82a02cf0aaa10893c1bf79ea08b9ce576f82749448
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp
date: 2018-09-09
modified: 2026-06-15
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003
- attack.t1558
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.t1003.002
logsource:
category: antivirus
detection:
selection:
- Signature|startswith: 'PWS'
- Signature|contains:
- 'Certify'
- 'DCSync'
- 'Creddump'
- 'DumpCreds'
- 'DumpLsass'
- 'DumpPert'
- 'FormBook'
- 'HTool/WCE'
- 'Kekeo'
- 'Lazagne'
- 'LsassDump'
- 'Lummast'
- 'Mimikatz'
- 'MultiDump'
- 'Multiverze'
- 'Nanodump'
- 'NativeDump'
- 'Outflank'
- 'PShlSpy'
- 'PSWTool'
- 'PWCrack'
- 'PWDump'
- 'PWS.'
- 'PWSX'
- 'pypykatz'
- 'Rubeus'
- 'SafetyKatz'
- 'SecurityTool'
- 'SharpChrome'
- 'SharpDPAPI'
- 'SharpDump'
- 'SharpKatz'
- 'SharpS.' # Sharpsploit, e.g. 530ea2ff9049f5dfdfa0a2e9c27c2e3c0685eb6cbdf85370c20a7bfae49f592d
- 'ShpKatz'
- 'Steal'
- 'TrickDump'
- 'wsass'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: critical
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗title: AWS SecurityHub Findings Evasion
id: a607e1fe-74bf-4440-a3ec-b059b9103157
status: stable
description: Detects the modification of the findings on SecurityHub.
references:
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/cli/latest/reference/securityhub/
author: Sittikorn S
date: 2021-06-28
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: aws
service: cloudtrail
detection:
selection:
eventSource: securityhub.amazonaws.com
eventName:
- 'BatchUpdateFindings'
- 'DeleteInsight'
- 'UpdateFindings'
- 'UpdateInsight'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- System or Network administrator behaviors
- DEV, UAT, SAT environment. You should apply this rule with PROD environment only.
level: high
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗title: Credential Dumping Activity By Python Based Tool
id: f8be3e82-46a3-4e4e-ada5-8e538ae8b9c9
related:
- id: 4b9a8556-99c4-470b-a40c-9c8d02c77ed0
type: obsolete
- id: 7186e989-4ed7-4f4e-a656-4674b9e3e48b
type: obsolete
status: stable
description: Detects LSASS process access for potential credential dumping by a Python-like tool such as LaZagne or Pypykatz.
references:
- https://twitter.com/bh4b3sh/status/1303674603819081728
- https://github.com/skelsec/pypykatz
author: Bhabesh Raj, Jonhnathan Ribeiro
date: 2023-11-27
modified: 2023-11-29
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.s0349
logsource:
category: process_access
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
CallTrace|contains|all:
- '_ctypes.pyd+'
- ':\Windows\System32\KERNELBASE.dll+'
- ':\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+'
CallTrace|contains:
- 'python27.dll+'
- 'python3*.dll+'
GrantedAccess: '0x1FFFFF'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗title: HackTool - CrackMapExec Execution Patterns
id: 058f4380-962d-40a5-afce-50207d36d7e2
status: stable
description: Detects various execution patterns of the CrackMapExec pentesting framework
references:
- https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2020-05-22
modified: 2023-11-06
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.persistence
- attack.execution
- attack.t1047
- attack.t1053
- attack.t1059.003
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.s0106
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
# cme/protocols/smb/wmiexec.py (generalized execute_remote and execute_fileless)
- 'cmd.exe /Q /c * 1> \\\\*\\*\\* 2>&1'
# cme/protocols/smb/atexec.py:109 (fileless output via share)
- 'cmd.exe /C * > \\\\*\\*\\* 2>&1'
# cme/protocols/smb/atexec.py:111 (fileless output via share)
- 'cmd.exe /C * > *\\Temp\\* 2>&1'
# https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/d8c50c8cbaf36c29329078662473f75e440978d2/cme/helpers/powershell.py#L136 (PowerShell execution with obfuscation)
- 'powershell.exe -exec bypass -noni -nop -w 1 -C "'
# https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/d8c50c8cbaf36c29329078662473f75e440978d2/cme/helpers/powershell.py#L160 (PowerShell execution without obfuscation)
- 'powershell.exe -noni -nop -w 1 -enc '
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗title: Microsoft Defender Tamper Protection Trigger
id: 49e5bc24-8b86-49f1-b743-535f332c2856
status: stable
description: Detects blocked attempts to change any of Defender's settings such as "Real Time Monitoring" and "Behavior Monitoring"
references:
- https://bhabeshraj.com/post/tampering-with-microsoft-defenders-tamper-protection
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/troubleshoot-microsoft-defender-antivirus?view=o365-worldwide
author: Bhabesh Raj, Nasreddine Bencherchali
date: 2021-07-05
modified: 2022-12-06
tags:
- attack.defense-impairment
- attack.t1685
logsource:
product: windows
service: windefend
detection:
selection:
EventID: 5013 # Tamper protection blocked a change to Microsoft Defender Antivirus. If Tamper protection is enabled then, any attempt to change any of Defender's settings is blocked. Event ID 5013 is generated and states which setting change was blocked.
Value|endswith:
- '\Windows Defender\DisableAntiSpyware'
- '\Windows Defender\DisableAntiVirus'
- '\Windows Defender\Scan\DisableArchiveScanning'
- '\Windows Defender\Scan\DisableScanningNetworkFiles'
- '\Real-Time Protection\DisableRealtimeMonitoring'
- '\Real-Time Protection\DisableBehaviorMonitoring'
- '\Real-Time Protection\DisableIOAVProtection'
- '\Real-Time Protection\DisableScriptScanning'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Administrator might try to disable defender features during testing (must be investigated)
level: high
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗title: OMIGOD HTTP No Authentication RCE - CVE-2021-38647
id: ab6b1a39-a9ee-4ab4-b075-e83acf6e346b
status: stable
description: |
Detects the exploitation of OMIGOD (CVE-2021-38647) which allows remote execute (RCE) commands as root with just a single unauthenticated HTTP request.
Verify, successful, exploitation by viewing the HTTP client (request) body to see what was passed to the server (using PCAP).
Within the client body is where the code execution would occur. Additionally, check the endpoint logs to see if suspicious commands or activity occurred within the timeframe of this HTTP request.
references:
- https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure
- https://twitter.com/neu5ron/status/1438987292971053057?s=20
author: Nate Guagenti (neu5ron)
date: 2021-09-20
modified: 2025-11-03
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.initial-access
- attack.execution
- attack.lateral-movement
- attack.t1068
- attack.t1190
- attack.t1203
- attack.t1021.006
- attack.t1210
- detection.emerging-threats
- cve.2021-38647
logsource:
product: zeek
service: http
definition: Enable the builtin Zeek script that logs all HTTP header names by adding "@load policy/protocols/http/header-names" to your local.zeek config file. The script can be seen here for reference https://github.com/zeek/zeek/blob/d957f883df242ef159cfd846884e673addeea7a5/scripts/policy/protocols/http/header-names.zeek
detection:
selection:
status_code: 200
uri: /wsman
method: POST
auth_header:
client_header_names|contains: 'AUTHORIZATION'
too_small_http_client_body:
request_body_len: 0
# winrm_ports:
# id.resp_p:
# - 5985
# - 5986
# - 1270
condition: selection and not auth_header and not too_small_http_client_body
# condition: selection and winrm_ports and not auth_header and not too_small_http_client_body # Enable this to only perform search on default WinRM ports, however those ports are sometimes changed and therefore this is disabled by default to give a broader coverage of this rule
falsepositives:
- Exploits that were attempted but unsuccessful.
- Scanning attempts with the abnormal use of the HTTP POST method with no indication of code execution within the HTTP Client (Request) body. An example would be vulnerability scanners trying to identify unpatched versions while not actually exploiting the vulnerability. See description for investigation tips.
level: high
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗title: Password Dumper Remote Thread in LSASS
id: f239b326-2f41-4d6b-9dfa-c846a60ef505
status: stable
description: |
Detects password dumper activity by monitoring remote thread creation EventID 8 in combination with the lsass.exe process as TargetImage.
The process in field Process is the malicious program. A single execution can lead to hundreds of events.
references:
- https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/WCE.htm
author: Thomas Patzke
date: 2017-02-19
modified: 2021-06-21
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.s0005
- attack.t1003.001
logsource:
product: windows
category: create_remote_thread
detection:
selection:
TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
StartModule: ''
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Antivirus products
level: high
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗title: Potential Emotet Activity
id: d02e8cf5-6099-48cf-9bfc-1eec2d0c7b18
status: stable
description: Detects all Emotet like process executions that are not covered by the more generic rules
references:
- https://app.any.run/tasks/e13ab713-64cf-4b23-ad93-6dceaa5429ac/
- https://app.any.run/tasks/81f3c28c-c686-425d-8a2b-a98198d244e1/
- https://app.any.run/tasks/97f875e8-0e08-4328-815f-055e971ba754/
- https://app.any.run/tasks/84fc9b4a-ea2b-47b1-8aa6-9014402dfb56/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2019-09-30
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.t1027
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' -e* PAA'
- 'JABlAG4AdgA6AHUAcwBlAHIAcAByAG8AZgBpAGwAZQ' # $env:userprofile
- 'QAZQBuAHYAOgB1AHMAZQByAHAAcgBvAGYAaQBsAGUA' # $env:userprofile
- 'kAGUAbgB2ADoAdQBzAGUAcgBwAHIAbwBmAGkAbABlA' # $env:userprofile
- 'IgAoACcAKgAnACkAOwAkA' # "('*');$
- 'IAKAAnACoAJwApADsAJA' # "('*');$
- 'iACgAJwAqACcAKQA7ACQA' # "('*');$
- 'JABGAGwAeAByAGgAYwBmAGQ'
- 'PQAkAGUAbgB2ADoAdABlAG0AcAArACgA' # =$env:temp+(
- '0AJABlAG4AdgA6AHQAZQBtAHAAKwAoA' # =$env:temp+(
- '9ACQAZQBuAHYAOgB0AGUAbQBwACsAKA' # =$env:temp+(
filter:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'fAAgAEMAbwBuAHYAZQByAHQAVABvAC0ASgBzAG8AbgAgAC0ARQByAHIAbwByAEEAYwB0AGkAbwBuACAAUwBpAGwAZQBuAHQAbAB5AEMAbwBuAHQAaQBuAHUAZQ'
- 'wAIABDAG8AbgB2AGUAcgB0AFQAbwAtAEoAcwBvAG4AIAAtAEUAcgByAG8AcgBBAGMAdABpAG8AbgAgAFMAaQBsAGUAbgB0AGwAeQBDAG8AbgB0AGkAbgB1AGUA'
- '8ACAAQwBvAG4AdgBlAHIAdABUAG8ALQBKAHMAbwBuACAALQBFAHIAcgBvAHIAQQBjAHQAaQBvAG4AIABTAGkAbABlAG4AdABsAHkAQwBvAG4AdABpAG4AdQBlA'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
View this rule on SigmaHQ ↗Detection rules licensed under Detection Rule License (DRL) 1.1, from SigmaHQ. Each rule retains its author.
Atomic Red Team validating tests mapped to this group's MITRE ATT&CK techniques, shown beside the detection rules so you can validate the detections. This shows the top few, with a link to the full set on GitHub. Descriptive metadata only, never the attack commands.
Red teamer's avoid IEX and Invoke-WebRequest in your PowerShell commands. Instead, host a text record with a payload to compromise hosts. [reference](https://twitter.com/jstrosch/status/1237382986557001729)
View this test on GitHub ↗Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Computer Objects reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
View this test on GitHub ↗Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Domain Controller Objects reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
View this test on GitHub ↗Adfind tool can be used for reconnaissance in an Active directory environment. This example has been documented by ransomware actors enumerating Active Directory Subnet Objects reference- http://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/, https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/04/pick-six-intercepting-a-fin6-intrusion.html
View this test on GitHub ↗Any easy way to bypass AMSI inspection is it patch the dll in memory setting the "amsiInitFailed" function to true. Upon execution, no output is displayed. https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2018/06/exploring-powershell-amsi-and-logging-evasion/
View this test on GitHub ↗Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -Command parameter
View this test on GitHub ↗Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -Command parameter with encoded arguments supplied
View this test on GitHub ↗Executes powershell.exe with variations of the -EncodedCommand parameter
View this test on GitHub ↗Atomic tests from Atomic Red Team, (c) Red Canary, MIT License. Not affiliated with or endorsed by Red Canary.
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